I may be slow, but I’m not stupid. I watched the videos from LaGuardia. I listened to the air traffic control audio. And what I saw was exactly what any firefighter, Coastie, or responder would recognize immediately: a crew responding to a legitimate emergency, moving under instructions, inside a system that was already overloaded.
Now the public narrative is drifting toward “the fire truck didn’t have a transponder,” as if that single detail explains away everything else. It doesn’t. In fact, it distracts from the real issues.
Let’s walk through what’s actually known.
1. The ARFF crew was responding to a real emergency.
They weren’t freelancing. They weren’t joyriding. They were crossing the runway to reach an aircraft with a reported odor issue. That’s their job.
2. Air Traffic Control was saturated.
The controller was juggling multiple aircraft, ground vehicles, and another emergency at the same time. Anyone who has ever worked in operations knows what that does to situational awareness. It narrows. It fragments. It overloads. It also fails to address the abhorrent shortages of air traffic control personnel.
3. The ATC audio includes the controller saying, “I messed up.”
That’s not speculation. It’s on the tapes. When a controller says that, it means exactly what it sounds like: a human error occurred in the tower.
4. The runway safety system didn’t trigger.
The system didn’t warn the landing aircraft because the fire truck didn’t have a transponder. But here’s the key point: ARFF vehicles are not required to carry aircraft‑grade transponders. The system is supposed to account for that. If it can’t, that’s a design flaw — not firefighter misconduct. Yet CNN and other mainstream media outlets are now scapegoating making this the issue.
5. System failures are not responder failures.
When a safety system fails to detect a vehicle, that’s a systems‑engineering problem.
When a controller gives movement instructions under heavy load, that’s a human‑factors problem.
Neither of those are firefighter problems.
6. Scapegoating responders is a familiar pattern.
When something goes wrong in aviation or public safety, the first instinct is often to blame the person closest to the incident. But the real causes are almost always layered: procedures, communication, workload, equipment, and system design.
This is one of those cases.
The firefighters were doing their job.
The controller was overwhelmed.
The safety system didn’t do what it was designed to do.
And now the narrative is trying to pin it on the one group that can’t defend themselves publicly.
We owe the truth to the people who died, the people who survived, and the responders who were doing exactly what they were trained and authorized to do.
About the Author
Fred LaPoint is a fire chief and paramedic with over fifty years of frontline experience in the fire service. A Coast Guard veteran and international disaster responder, he has spent his life teaching communities how emergencies really unfold and how ordinary people can stay safer, smarter, and better prepared. Behind The Alarm is his way of passing on the lessons earned through decades of calls, crises, and command decisions — explained in plain language, without fear‑mongering or sugarcoating. Fred writes to help people understand the risks around them and the systems meant to protect them, because informed communities are safer communities.
This article first appeared in Behind The Alarm, the newsletter of Fred R. LaPoint, Fire Chief Paramedic of the Stronach Township Fire Department, on March 24, 2026. Read the original.